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This paper presents a critical analysis of the factors shaping the interaction between
multinationals and trade unions in Indonesia, focusing on the recent period of democratization
following the downfall of the Suharto regime. It has been suggested that union growth risks
undermining Indonesia’s competitive advantages (cheap labour) and could encourage the
exit of multinationals to cheaper competitors. In order to test this proposition, two case studies
were conducted: one in the automotive industry and the other in the banking industry.
The paper first provides an overview of multinational activity and FDI in Indonesia, and
their interaction with a nascent union movement. This is followed by presenting the findings
of interviews conducted at the multinational enterprises with managers and union officials;
to provide empirical insights into the bargaining process. The final part of the paper provides
a preliminary assessment of the impact of union behaviour on MNC profitability and
competitiveness in Indonesia. In contrast to traditional views of unions as impeding MNC
profitability and “encouraging” exit, the paper finds that unions and MNCs can engage in
constructive partnerships, but that pressures and contradictions in the relationship remain.
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Introduction
It has been argued that the activities of
multinationals (MNCs) were an important
contributor to Indonesia’s rapid economic
growth during the New Order era, along with
orthodox macro-economic policy and political
stability (Hill, 1988: introduction). This
situation is commensurate with the argument
that developing countries often seek to
underpin economic growth via foreign direct
investment (FDI), which is attracted by cheap
and compliant labour (Abbott, as cited in
Rowley and Benson, 2000: 6). MNCs can
use foreign investment in developing
countries as a countermeasure to problems
of profitability and competitiveness in those
economies arising from the pressures of high
labour costs, union militancy, and labour
market rigidities (Schoenberger, 1989). MNCs
are attracted to developing countries because
labour in these countries is cheaper, readily
available, equally productive, more easily
subjected to discipline and work longer hours
(Southall, 1988: 10). Trade unionism in
Indonesia on the other hand, has had a long
history, having commenced during the period
of Dutch colonial rule in 1897. After
independence in 1948, one of the biggest
trade unions at that time, SOBSI (Centre of
All-Indonesia Workers Organisation)
announced their affiliation with the Indonesian
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Communist Party. When the Communist party
was suppressed in 1966 with the emergence
of Suharto’s government, SOBSI was banned.
Suharto styled his cabinet as the New Order
and proceeded to centralise labour relations.
When the Asian financial crisis occurred
in 1997, the Indonesian economy collapsed,
demonstrating the fragility of Indonesia’s
economic and social foundations. This resulted
in a mass desire for social reformation and
hence the downfall of Suharto. Industrial
relations was one of the areas where reforms
took place. There were changes in the laws
relating to employment conditions, including
those which give trade unions the rights to
independently establish and organise. However,
it is not clear what effect these changes have
had on union activity and interaction with
MNCs.
Indeed, it is apparent that there is a shortage
of data on unions and their activity in
multinational establishments in Indonesia.
There is virtually no data on trade union density
in multinationals or by industry in Indonesia.
In the absence of aggregate data, more
industry-level case study research is needed.
Hence, there is a need to examine how
these changes have affected industrial relations
practices at workplace level. Do unions enjoy
greater freedom after the reformation era?
How have multinationals reacted to the
changes and what actions have they taken so
far? This paper commences by providing a
conceptual and empirical appraisal of
multinationals and labour in developing
countries; followed by an empirical overview
of multinationals and unionism in Indonesia.
The final part of the paper provides a
preliminary assessment of how the relationship
between multinationals and unions is shaped
in the workplace.
Multinationals and Labour in
Developing Countries
The presence of multinationals has raised
some controversies despite their important
role in driving forward the globalization of
economic activity and their capability in
stimulating industrialization in developing
countries. Labour exploitation is one of the
main themes of controversy; along with host
country’s economic policy, national
sovereignty, and cultural identity (Guillen,
2000: 124).
Abbott argues that developing countries
often seek to underpin economic growth via
foreign investment, which is attracted by
cheap and compliant labour (Abbott, as cited
in Rowley and Benson,  2000:6) .
Multinationals from developed economies,
on the other hand, can use foreign investment
in developing countries as a defensive reaction
to problems of  prof i tabi l i ty  and
competitiveness in those economies arising
from the pressures of high labour costs, union
militancy, and labour market rigidities
(Schoenberger, 1989). The issue of “cheap”
labour has made the presence of multinationals
in developing countries a more debated issue
than in dev eloped economies. Guillen (2001)
lists three key features of the debate, which
are:
1. Most developing countries are rich in
natural resources and/or cheap labour that
multinationals lack in their home
countries. Abundant cheap labour is
definitely an attracting point of a host
country.
2. During the post-World War II period,
many developing countries were ruled
by authoritarian regimes, which tended
to repress labour and mollify its political
and economic demands to satisfy
investors. One of the most unique features
of industrial relations in developing
countries is the centrality of the state in
terms of tight governmental control over
the trade union movement and its
activities. The purpose arguably has been
to protect the interest of foreign capital
(Bean, 1994: 218). This control was
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Source: Guillen (2001)
Table 1. Organised labour’s perceptions of multinationals
Economic Mentality of  Organized Labour
Modernizing Populist
Political
Regime
MNE = Partner
Democracy and a modernising mentality
enable unions to play an institutionalised
role in the strategy of outward-oriented
economic development and to monitor
MNE activities in the country.
Democratic
with full
labour rights
Authoritarian
and / or
repressive
MNE = Arm’s-Length Collaborator
Authoritarianism and a modernising mentality
lead unions to accept the presence of MNEs
only as collaborators of local firms on which
they can exert a more direct pressure.
MNE = Necessary Evil
Democracy and a populist mentality
lead unions to accept the presence of
MNEs in key import substitution
industries in exchange for  job security
and enhanced purchasing power.
MNE = Villain
Authoritarianism and a populist
mentality lead to a rejection of the
presence of MNEs as unions feel
powerless.
strengthened by growth-oriented
developmental plans in developing
countries where the state is much more
centralised. In most developing countries,
strikes prove burdensome as they neither
encourage the welfare of capital nor attract
foreign investment, both of which become
identified with the ‘national interest’ (ibid:
220).
3. Multinationals are often perceived as
limiting national sovereignty or being
agents of colonialism. The dependence
of developing countries on multinationals
has forced governments to consider
multinationals’ interests in developing
national policies, which sometimes
disadvantage the host country’s labour.
However, even though the presence of
multinationals is more debated in developing
countries, not all trade unions perceive
multinationals as ‘enemies’; some of them
see multinationals as partners. This perception
is influenced by two factors: the political
regime of the host country and the economic
mentality of organised labour (Guillen, 2001:
130-131). The political regime can be
democratic with full labour rights or
authoritarian and/or repressive approach. The
economic mentality of organised labour can
also be classified as “modernising” or
“populist”. The modernising mentality
emphasises productivity, flexibility, and
competitiveness among the workers. The
populist mentality, on the other hand,
emphasises short-term compromise and
redistribution at the expense of long-term
prosperity.  The combination of political
regimes and economic mentalities of labor
produces four kinds of organised labour
perceptions over multinationals, as shown in
the Table 1.
Guillen (2001) argues that perceptions
vary from villain to partner. A populist trade
union in a country with an authoritarian regime
will see multinationals as villains, which leads
them to reject multinationals, as their presence
will weaken trade unions. Argentina, Spain,
and South Korea in 1950s and early 1960s are
the example where unions perceived
multinationals as villains. Unions at that time
believed that multinationals helped to
legitimate authoritarian regimes in their country
and that multinationals have exploited working
classes in the context of unequal international
division of labour between advanced and
developing countries.
In contrast, a modernising trade union with
democratic regime will see multinationals as
partners because of the ability of unions to
play a role in the strategy of outward-oriented
economic development as well as to monitor
multinationals activities in the country.
However, among these countries, only Spanish
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Table 2.  Trend of Investment Planning Approvals by Country of Origin, 2001 - 2005,
in million US$
NO. Country of Origin 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
1 Singapore    1,173.2 3,376.6 801.4 617.5 3,933.2
2 United Kingdom      793.4 747.2 999.4 1,318.5 1,529.0
3 Japan      817.6 518.5 1,251.5 1,688.9 1,176.4
4 Malaysia      2,243.6 74.8 336.5 483.0 587.3
5 Australia      273.5 278.3 129.1 481.2 513.6
6 Netherlands        88.8 244.1 353.6 258.7 472.3
7 South Korea      373.4 378.3 166.2 419.3 417.3
8 People's Republic of China    6,054.5 46.6 264.0 24.6 205.0
9 United States of America        87.7 468.5 211.7 133.3 91.2
10 Mauritius      523.8 862.1 4,572.4 355.4 6.6
11 Domestic Investment 59,898.5 25,949.4 55,707.2 44,522.2 50,577.3
Source: http://www.bkpm.go.id/bkpm/file_fact/Tabel-35.xls 
trade unions perceived multinationals as
partners in 1990s. Spanish unions have been
fully persuaded that multinationals could create
jobs, bring technology, and improve economic
well being in Spain.
In the 1990s, South Korean unions, on the
other hand, multinationals were perceived as
arm’s length collaborators at best; needed in
the pursuit of export-led growth. This
perception was held as the result of
government’s unwillingness to take labour
into account during the transition to democracy
in the early 1990s. The perception of Argentine
unions towards multinationals is not
significantly different from their Korean
counterparts. Owing to Peron (1952-1955)
who successfully created The General
Confederation of Labour (CGT), the Argentine
peak union at that time into a nationalist and
populist trade union, unions’ attitudes in
Argentina were very intolerant and perceived
multinationals as necessary evils.
Multinationals in Indonesia:
the Debate
After decades of hostile approach towards
multinationals during Sukarno’s era, Indonesia
tried to restore its reputation with international
business as part of its efforts to attract foreign
investors since 1966. Thus, the early years of
the New Order government were characterised
by a very liberal policy towards multinationals
in order to attract foreign direct investment.
It has been argued that the activities of
multinationals were an important factor in
Indonesia’s rapid economic growth during the
New Order, along with orthodox macro-
economic policy and political stability (Hill,
1988: introduction).
Japanese multinationals were chief
amongst those who have expanded their
business in Indonesia since then. In fact, the
Japanese have been the largest investors in
Indonesia, especially in the manufacturing
sector. Another developed country, the United
States, has dominated the petroleum sector
(ibid: p. 54). Over the period 1967-1984, these
two countries accounted for almost 80 percent
of gross realised investment in all sectors,
owing mainly to American investment in
petroleum sector since the last 1970s. However,
recent data shows that United States no longer
dominates foreign investment in Indonesia.
Rather, other Asian and European countries
are now investing more in Indonesia, such as
Singapore and United Kingdom. There is no
data, however, in which sectors these countries
are investing.
1(www.dprin.go.id/ind/statistik/STATINDUS/ik03_chart.asp)
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Regardless the country of origin of foreign
direct investment, attracting multinationals
requires the presence of some necessary
conditions. Cheap labour is one of the
necessary conditions, as Indonesia did not
have technological superiority or abundant
skilled labour at that time. Hence, the majority
of multinationals invest in industries which
are labour-intensive in nature, such as textile,
garments, electronic manufacturing and motor
vehicles manufacturing industries. Another
factor of importance with respect to Indonesia
is that it possesses abundant natural resources:
especially gas and petroleum; which needs
foreign technological expertise in order to be
able to utilise these assets.
Unionism in Multi-nationals
in Indonesia
The ability of trade unions to pursue their
objectives has to be placed in the context of
multinational activity. In Indonesia there are
issues pertaining to the interaction between
unions and multinationals and the union
movement is still facing serious challenges,
especially at enterprise-level. This challenge
comes from the nature of multinationals,
which played a very important role in
economic development during the New Order
period. Textile, garments, and footwear are
those industries where were dominated by
foreign investors, and were able to absorbed
a huge number of employment. In year 2000,
these industries employed more than 2.2
million workers1.
As they operate within several countries,
multinationals deal with a number of industrial
relations systems simultaneously. This
condition is believed to create asymmetrical
relationships between multinationals,
government, and unions. Unions are
threatened with the superior position of
multinationals by the latter’s ability to relocate
their business to more favoured locations.
Enderwick (1985) and Bean (1994) argue that
multinationals often use their ability to relocate
their production facilities to put trade unions
in a dis-advantageous position. Actual shifts
reduce job security and labour demand, while
the threat of closure may be used as a
bargaining tactic.
Furthermore, the broader financial base
of multinationals weakens the bargaining
power of unions. In the event or threat of
strikes at one of the subsidiaries, multinationals
can maintain production at other sites, and
thus their cash-flows; which alleviates the
costs of strike activity. This situation is in
turn heavily influenced by the stance of the
state: e.g., the law introduced by the
government to reserve foreign investment,
such as the policy of a sole union controlled
by the government which existed in Indonesia
between 1973 -1998. Thus, government
policies on labour significantly influence the
behaviour of multinationals in these industries.
They may compare other countries’ policy
over labour and relocate their business if they
consider that doing business in other countries
would be cheaper and more profitable than
in Indonesia. The decisions of the government
to increase minimum wage and give greater
freedom to unionism have been argued to be
one of the main reasons of multinationals’
relocation. Vietnam is considered as the main
competitor as it provides cheaper wages and
non-unionised workers.
An example of the production relocation
practiced by multinationals is what has been
done by Nike. Nike tends to relocate its
business once the labour of the host country
became more expensive. Nike chose Korea
as its main sites in 1960s, but then moved to
Taiwan in 1970s, when the labour cost in
Korea increased. Indonesia and China then
became its main destination in 1980s (see
http://www.globalexchange.org/). However,
in September 2002, PT Doson which is one
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of Nike’s subcontractors in Indonesia closed
its plant, causing about 7,000 job losses. The
previous PT Doson workers believed that the
great freedom given to the factory’s union
made Nike more difficult to control its
workers. This closure pushed Nike footwear
production fall to 26% from 38% in 1996.
The figure depicts clearer picture: In 1996,
Indonesia still exported 250 million pairs of
Nike shoes valued at nearly $2.2 billion. In
2001, the figure was dramatically dropped
to only $1.5 billion and falling. Vietnam,
which is considered as a close competitor in
footwear industry, has successfully increased
its share on Nike’s production to 15% from
only 2%.
Union activists suspected that the closure
was driven by the greater union freedom at
this factory compared to other Nike factories
in Indonesia. Union leaders believe that the
friction between the union and management
over a new contract has been the main reason.
The deadlock over the agreement led to a
strike on October 2001, followed by massive
layoffs on December 2001.
Therefore, it can be concluded that the
difference in trade union experience after the
downfall of the New Order government so
far is only in terms of greater freedom to
establish unions. Union freedom in organizing
and mobilizing their members is still facing
great challenges. The challenge still comes
from the presence of military intervention in
dismissing and/or curbing labour unrest, like
what had happened in the New Order period.
Furthermore, the fact that the unemployment
rate is very high in Indonesia makes workers
more inclined to want to keep their jobs rather
than actively involved in union activities,
which could potentially endanger their liberty
as well as job security.
Method
The method used in gathering data is
through case studies. Case studies are one of
most common ways to conduct qualitative
research. Yin (2003) defines a case study as
‘an empirical enquiry that investigates a
contemporary phenomenon within its real-
life context when the boundaries between
phenomenon and context are not clearly
evident’ (Yin 2003: 13). This research consists
of findings from two case studies (comprising
interviews with managers, union reps and
members; and ILO representatives) that were
conducted with unions and multinational
firms in Indonesia.
The first multinational is a Japanese
company that operates in automotive industry.
They have operated in Indonesia for more
than three decades and have now become
one of the biggest car producers in this
country. Employing more than 5,000
employees, this company has had a long
history of union recognition in Indonesia.
The union in this multinational is affiliated
with the All-Indonesian Workers Union
(Serikat Pekerja Seluruh Indonesia – SPSI),
within the section of Metal, Electronic, and
Machinery union.
The second multinational studied is a
European company that has operated in
Indonesia for more than 40 years. It is now
a well-established foreign bank in Indonesia,
employing around 300 employees and
recognizes unions in its workplace.
Organizing half of the total employees, the
union in the multinational is affiliated with
the All-Indonesian Workers Association
(Asosiasi Pekerja Indonesia – Aspek
Indonesia) since 1998.
Given the shortage of the research on
trade unionism and MNCs in Indonesia, this
research will provide a valuable insight into
union and MNC behaviour at a workplace
level. Firm-level rather than industry-wide
research was chosen in order to ensure depth
and richness of data generated. Thus, the
research seeks to shed light on the labour
process, in order to develop a more
comprehensive understanding of union
strategies within a given context. Furthermore,
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in-depth telephone interviews were conducted
with an ILO Jakarta official  and
representatives from two key unions in
Indonesia for a broader view.
The first key union was a union
confederation which was established in 2003
and currently affiliates with ten union
federations from varied sectors, such as
education, textile, mining, health, forestry,
banking, etc. According to the verification
by the Ministry of Employment, the union
has around 2.9 million members, but the
union claims that the number is actually
higher. The difference occurs because
verification needs to follow time-consuming
highly bureaucratic procedures. Thus, not all
union members have been successfully
registered in the Ministry of Employment.
This union has various characteristics of
members, from low-skilled manual workers
like those working in assembly lines to skilled
workers like those who work in the education
or banking sectors.
The second key union participant
interviewed in this research was from a union
federation which had actually been
established since 1972 as a sector of the SPSI
(the only union being recognised during the
New Order period). However, in 1999, they
detached themselves from the SPSI and
formed an independent union called the
Textile and Leather Union. They changed
their name again in 2002 as the result of the
union’s general congress to enable them to
recruit members from other sectors.  Currently
they have approximately 436,000 members,
showing a significant decrease since the first
time they became an independent union,
which was about 700,000 members.
According to the representative, the main
causes of the contraction were massive
dismissals and increase use of contract
workers that has been legitimated by Law
No. 13 Year 2003.
The interviews were semi-structured and
based around the following issues:
1. The nature of the relationship
between the union and management.
2. The union’s strategy in dealing with
management; whether this strategy
has ever changed and how management
 responds to this strategy.
3. How the Indonesian economic and
social context affects multinational
and union operations.
In each multinational, interviews involved
managers and union representatives. In the
first multinational which operates in the
automotive industry, two CEOs, four
managers from the human resources
department and six union representatives
were interviewed; whilst in the second
multinational, one CEO and two managers
from human resources department and eight
union representatives were involved.
The interviews were supplemented with
aggregate data and documentary analysis. At
all times the strict ethical principles of fully-
informed voluntary  par t ic ipat ion,
confidentiality and anonymity; and the
opportunity to review interview transcripts
– were adhered to.
Findings:
A Preliminary Assessment of
Multinationals and Unions in
Indonesia
In both multinationals, there has been a
lengthy period of union recognition. The
main reasons for this were because it is
obligatory by law and unions were seen as a
necessary aspect in the workplace. However,
the pattern of the management-union
relationship in each workplace is quite
different. It can be argued that the nature of
the industries where the multinationals
operate, the number of members each union
have and the background of the employees
being organised by the union have shaped
this relationship.
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Case Study in Multinational
Automotive Industry
The union in this multinational has been
recognised since the 1980s. This multinational
has a policy that all employees will
automatically become union members except
if they refuse it; and thus the union currently
organises around 5,000 employees in the
workplace: approximately 99 per cent of the
workforce are union members. Hence
management “recognises” the union, as it
has an integral presence in the establishment
and they need a “partner” from the employees
in managing the company. Management also
stated that the union is a necessary aspect
within the company; as the union provides a
communication function, whereby the union
communicates targets and changes from the
management to the employees and
communicates employees’ aspirations to the
management. As said by one of the managers:
“through them we speak to the employees.
We also try to maintain a good working
environment with them, so that the employees
would be less likely to engage in dispute
activity if they are not satisfied. I think it’s
the most effective way of communicating with
the employees.”
In contrast to unions in developed
countries, there are no full-time union
professionals involved in the bargaining
process (nor do union members in the
establishment have any desire to become full-
time paid officers – even though the company
has been willing to fund such arrangements
– concerns were typically expressed over
career paths for example). Thus the bargaining
process is enterprise-led and the (branch of
the) union effectively can be considered as
an “enterprise union”.
Management-union relationship and
strategy
As such, both management and union
suggested that their relationship in the
workplace was harmonious and based on a
unitarist perspective of shared goals (although
this appears to be under pressure, as seen
below). The concept of partnership at work
was initiated by both parties and stated in the
CLA since the 1990s. The company needs to
have a strong union engaged as their partner.
However, both parties admit that there are
fluctuations in the relationship caused by
gaps in expectations and in understanding
the conditions of the company. Management
feels that gaps are widened particularly when
a new union leader is appointed. In their view,
how to deal with the union really depends
on the style of the union’s leader. Whilst
succession planning (or regeneration) in the
managerial level is well-planned, some
managers feel that the union does not have
a clear concept of regeneration. Failure in
appointing an experienced leader will lead
to widening the gap in expectations; which
is happening currently. This dependence on
the union leader’s style in dealing with
management is also admitted by the union.
However, the union leader was aware that
leader-oriented dependency should be
replaced by systems-oriented approach
(systematic procedures in place). As he
mentioned:
“so far the union’s strategy really has
depended on the leader’s style; and every
leader’s style would differ, so this is the
challenge that we unions have: to depend on
systems and not depend on individuals. In
the past as we have found the pattern
depending on leader’s style was not a
problem. But in the future, the challenge
would be greater that we have to depend on
a system.  This is what we are working out
now.”
The union, on the other hand, feels the
current gap is mainly caused by major change
in the ownership of the company. As the
headquarters of the multinational has great
discretion in monitoring its subsidiary; the
union feels that there are changes in the way
management communicate with them.  One
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of their main concerns is the change in
formulating the collective agreement (CLA),
which they regard as a very fundamental and
worrying change.
“well, now the company is proposing that
we gradually have to make a code of conduct;
and separate the issues which are included
in CLA and code of conduct. For example,
we only talk about the amount of money in
the CLA - but the guidance of implementation
and rules will no longer be part of the CLA.
And this is definitely not our previous
environment anymore. We became aware of
this in 2005 and the change has not been
fully implemented yet because we don’t feel
comfortable with this.”
Union representatives argue that a
perceived breach of conditions outlined in
CLAs can be brought before the Labour Court
for a hearing. In contrast, they argue that
breaches of a “code of conduct” cannot be
brought before the Labour Court. This lack
of a policing mechanism is thus a cause for
concern by unions. This has occurred as a
result of a change in ownership in 2003, with
the parent (Japanese) company increasing its
ownership from 49% to 95%; and is indicative
of the parent company’s desire to implement
Japanese-style CLAs (which are less
extensive than Indonesian agreements and
offer a higher degree of management
prerogative). Despite the promotion of the
partnership concept at work, both
management and union have started
increasingly questioning their strategy in
dealing with each other. The union leader
thinks that they will have to change their
strategy in dealing with management. The
leader, however, is still not sure what sort of
new strategy they will take. Management
also feels that the union is not as
compromising as much as they used to be
previously:
“there are some changes. In 2001, with the
previous representatives in the union…
communication went well, the relationship
was OK. But with the new representatives,
sometimes all of us become silent in the
middle of negotiation (because of
disagreement). The new representatives often
advocate the members who actually make
mistakes. They gradually changed though,
but there is still an impression that some of
them ask us to negotiate issues that we think
are our prerogative.”
Evident from the above is the important
nature of personal contacts in the bargaining
process (given the lack of involvement of
professional union officers); and consequent
informal channels of communication.
However, more importantly, a less favourable
product market post-1997 has translated into
an erosion of “trust” and “partnership” in the
workplace, as profit margins are squeezed
and the company hence seeks additional
“concessions” from the union. Also, as noted
above, it is not yet apparent whether the union
will become more militant in its outlook –
here external constraints are significant (see
below).
Reaction to external challenges
The automotive industry is one of the
industries that has been highly affected by
the major changes that have taken place in
Indonesia since 1998. The 1997 crisis led to
lower purchasing power for many Indonesians
and hence resulted in lower domestic demand
for cars. This condition has been worsened
by the situation where the political
environment is still not stable; in addition to
perceived problems of corruption and lack
of economic infrastructure - which was
revealed by one of the CEOs.
“there are many things that Indonesia has
to change…. corruption, for example. If you
have those kinds of things, it means that you
have to change those things. Otherwise,
overseas investors like us would be less
attracted. The government should be clean
and transparent and also fair. Another thing
is that, when a country is becoming affluent
it means that its social infrastructure; say,
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roads, electricity, gas and water supply - and
from our perspective -  industrial
infrastructure, need to be improved.”
As such, it should be noted that only one
car model is manufactured by the company
in Indonesia; as such the Indonesian
establishment must “compete” with
establishments elsewhere in the SE Asian
region. However, it is prescient to note that
none of the CEOs and managers regards the
union as a threat to operating in Indonesia
and the company has invested new plant and
equipment to produce a second model (given
the still large latent domestic demand).
However, in contrast to the general perception
of unions that Employment Law No. 13 Year
2003 has favoured employers; management’s
view that this law protects employees and
unions. Management in this multinational,
however, is not really concerned with this
law as they feel that wages and working
conditions in the company are above the
standard mentioned in the law. They are even
optimistic that the employment system in the
company would work even if no employment
laws existed.
In terms of labour cost, both management
and union agree that Indonesia still provides
relatively cheap labour which can continue
to attract multinationals. However, the same
CEO stated than as labour costs rise with
development, a country such as Indonesia
would need to develop other sources of
competitive advantage in order to maintain
its attractiveness for multinationals.
Case Study in Multinational in
Banking Industry
This multinational has operated in
Indonesia for more that 40 years. The business
so far has been stable as the CEO said that
the growth of this multinational is always
within the growth path. In contrast to the
previous example, as a service industry
company catering to domestic demand; direct
contact with customers is essential and hence
necessitates “producing” in Indonesia (thus
the prospect of cheaper labour from elsewhere
in the region is a non-sequitur).
The multinational has recognised unions
since 1977. However, in 1998, after the
democratisation era the union affiliated to a
union federation which organises mainly in
the banking and retail sectors. The union
membership consists of around half of the
300 employees in the multinational
establishment. The majority of the union
members are female with the ratio of 3:1 to
male members. The union leader themselves
is female whose position in the company is
also one of the senior managers.
Management-union relationship and
strategy
The concept of partnership is also held
in the workplace. Management regards the
union as part of their team in creating a
healthy working atmosphere. However, the
union leader thinks that it is not actually
100% partnership as there are some issues
which are not discussed with the union,
particularly those related to finance/the
budget.
The management and union both favour
negotiation in reaching agreements. The union
leader stated that strikes are only entered into
as a last resort and that they prefer to negotiate
even if it takes time. As she stated
“we value negotiation… the ‘white collars’
in Indonesia are quite hesitant to get involve
in industrial action. We prefer to argue with
the management even if we have to do it
overnight. When we cannot reach agreement
or if they want to show their sympathy to
their colleagues, we just wear special signs
in our costume (e.g. black ribbon) or write
our disagreement and put it on their desks -
 but we keep working.”
Management and the union suggest that
their relationship is always “harmonious”.
As such, the union largely accepts the agenda
of the company and (sharing a unitarist
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perspective with the company) communicates
it to members. Like the first multinational
being studied, the union in this company also
provides a communication function which
in turn, gives advantages to the management
and confers legitimacy to management
actions. Both managers and union
representatives stressed that the company
paid employees very well (office jobs
typically entailed pay over three times that
of the minimum wage); and that employees
were generally satisfied with their pay rates.
As such, jobs in the company were highly
desirable as formal service sector jobs.
Reaction to external challenges
As noted above, low labour costs are not
the main attraction for multinationals
operating in the banking industry. Rather,
they try to recruit and retain highly productive
workers. As such, one of the main concerns
of the CEO is Employment Law No. 13 Year
2003. The CEO argued that this law gives
too little discretion to company to dismiss or
demote poorly performing individuals
(severance pay for example, must be paid,
even if it is the dismissed employee who has
committed gross negligence) and thus is a
constraint on the managerial prerogative of
“hire and fire”:
“I think the law is not good for the spirit of
competitiveness. We should stick to
competitiveness. For example, the spirit of
the law currently doesn’t allow us to penalise
non-performers. Some will stay and perform
poorly and get paid rather than perhaps
getting a better [for them] job elsewhere.
The law guarantees a comfort zone for non-
performers.”
Despite believing that the government of
Indonesia is trying hard to make everything
better, managers also want to see
improvements in the legal system, stability
of the currency, public infrastructure, and
labour quality. But the company has assured
employees that they will stay in Indonesia.
Discussion
The case studies presented in this paper
have offered important insights into the nature
(and change) of the bargaining process in
Indonesia. Both multinationals studied had
partnership arrangements with the union for
managing the workplace and thus, negotiation
was the main tool in reaching agreement. As
such, in terms of Guillen’s framework, prima
facie, they can be considered as “partners”.
The tradition of unionism in these
multinationals is strong as both have long
recognised unions.
The multinationals studied in this paper
preferred to have only one union in the
workplace as their partner. In this situation
they argued that it was much more efficient
to only have to negotiate with one union. The
managers of the multinationals did not see
unions as a threat to the profitability of their
business. Rather, they highlighted external
problems such as the legal system and lack
of public infrastructure as barriers to sound
economic performance. This behaviour
towards unionism was very different from
the case of Nike highlighted earlier (which
as indicated relocated their business out of
Indonesia due to emerging unionism in the
workplace).
The nature of the industries (formal sector
with above-average wages) where the
multinationals operate also contributed to a
generally good relationship between
management and unions. However, apparent
was a contrast between the two case studies
– in the automotive industry study, the change
of ownership had precipitated a change in
management attitudes and hence a
deterioration of “trust”. Here product market
pressures (and the implicit threat of relocation,
given viable alternative production sites in
the region) stood in stark contrast to the
banking industry example. In the banking
example, operating in the services sector
means that in order to serve the customers,
it has to exist near the customers. Thus, the
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threat of relocation is not really a viable
option if the company wishes to cater to the
Indonesian market. As such, the corporate
banking industry is quite a stable one, so it
could be said that the union and employee
respondents in this study both felt secure
with their jobs.
As such, a clear difference can be seen
from the multinational operating in
automotive industry. Cheap labour was the
main reason for this multinational in choosing
Indonesia as its production base. As the price
of labour is the main factor in maintaining
production in Indonesia, changes in managing
the company and union are seen as big matters
for both the management and union. However,
concerning the amount of investment this
multinational has made in Indonesia, the
employees and union are still optimistic that
this company will retain some kind of
presence in Indonesia for the foreseeable
future, which in turn gives the union some
confidence in negotiations.
Both multinationals also had employment
standards which were above the minimums
stipulated in Employment Law No. 13 Year
2003. While the general perception of unions
was that this law favours the employers, the
management of the multinationals see it
differently. It was argued that the law has
discouraged competitiveness as an employer
cannot impose financial penalties on workers
who are poor performers. If an employer
were to dismiss non-performers, they will
have to pay a particular amount of severance
pay, which according to managers, should
not happen. If this is indicative of “excessive”
labour regulation costs then it could inhibit
foreign direct investment. Indeed, as seen,
such arguments have underpinned the recent
thrust of employment legislation in Indonesia.
Conclusions and Suggestions
for Further Research
This paper has examined the management-
union relationship in multinationals in
Indonesia. The findings in the paper do not
conform to the general perception that
multinationals tend to relocate their business
and thus, weaken the position of the organised
labour. On the other hand, these findings
confirm the argument of Guillen (2000) that
not all unions perceive multinationals as their
enemy and are willing to engage in
partnership and compromise in pursuit of
their objectives. The findings should be
treated with caution, however, as this research
involves multinationals from particular
countries which operate is particular industries
(in the formal sector).
Multinationals which originate from a
country which does not have a strong tradition
in recognising union may have a very different
story (as evidenced by the practices of Nike
in Indonesia). Furthermore, multinationals
that subcontract their business to other
companies may find it easier to relocate
business and can use this condition to inhibit
unionism in the workplace.
Despite these limitations, these findings
are interesting for further discussion and shed
important light on the changing nature of
employee relations in Indonesia. Further
analysis on other industries (and examining
multinationals from other countries)
can shed more light on whether external
factors (e.g. politic and legal system) or cost
considerations are more important to
multinational production decisions and their
interaction with unions.
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